Transfer
Pricing in the United States
A Primer
© 2007
Peter J. Loughlin, Esq., J.D.,
LL.M.
Part
I
History and Discussion
of General Concepts
The
collection of income tax from individuals and
corporations commenced on October 1913 following the
passing of the 16th Amendment to the
Constitution.[1]
U.S. tax policy, while initially focusing
within its borders quickly began to shift gears to
consideration of foreign credit, and eventually capture
economic activity on an international scale with the
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1918.[2]
The following decade
brought about an international spirit of cooperation
following World War I and, at the urging of President
Woodrow Wilson, culminated in the organizing of the League
of Nations. Ironically the United States
did not join the moribund organization, however, the League
has left the world a legacy that established the basis of
modern international taxation, namely, the first model
income tax treaty – which serves as the basis of all modern
tax treaties today.[3]
The United States, then,
has been an innovator, developer and originator of
international tax policy from time immemorial, at least in
terms of modern principles. Not
surprisingly, then, the world’s first intercompany pricing
regulations under IRC § 482 was passed in the U.S. in
1934[4]
and set forth what has become known as the
arms length standard.
In 1961 the process of revamping §
482 began as prompted by presidential recommendation and
culminated in substantial changes to the legislation but
preserving the core focus of the arms length
standard. The U.S. model has been well
received throughout the word and has formed the basis of
the O.E.C.D Model Income Tax Convention in 1969 and the
O.E.C.D. Guidelines on transfer pricing promulgated in
1995. Thus the regulation and control
of intercomany pricing may be, to some degree, traced
back to the United States in the early 20th
Century. However, intercompany
pricing, or transfer pricing has been practiced by
companies and taxpayers as a form of profit shifting at
least the past several centuries.[5]
In order
to proceed to our examination of U.S. policy under IRC §
482, we must first review some core concepts essential to
our understanding.
What is the
transfer price?
The
transfer price, as its terms would imply is, at its
heart, the selling price at which goods, services, or
intangibles are exchanged between related
parties. This definition itself raises
two sub questions:
·
What is a
related party? Under § 482 related
parties, the law looks to de facto control of the parties
rather than mere legal control[6]
thus any control, even control by one entity over another
that lacks legal enforceability, will satisfy the section’s
definition of a related party.[7]
This concept also finds support in case
law under the Tax Court decision in DHL Corporation v.
Commissioner.[8]
·
What
restrictions, if any, are placed on the intercompany
pricing? Companies are free to
establish any intercompany pricing scheme they wish, and for
any purpose, for example, profit shifting. Notwithstanding, §
482 authorizes the Internal Revenue Service to reallocate the
“shifted” gross income, deductions, credits, etc., between the
related parties to avoid tax evasion or reflect the
true effect as determined by application of the arms length
standard.[9]
What is
meant by the “arms length
standard”?
This is
succinctly answered by looking to the O.E.C.D Guidelines,
which you will recall having its genesis in §
482:
“[When] conditions are made or imposed between . . . two
[associated] enterprises in their commercial or financial
relations which differ from those that would be made
between independent enterprises, then any profits which
would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of
the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have
not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that
enterprise and taxed accordingly.”[10]
How do
related parties, and the IRS, determine the arms length
price?
The arms
length price is determined by comparing the
transaction(s) of the controlled or related entities with
the transaction(s) of the transaction(s) of uncontrolled
entities. Note that the comparable
transaction need not be identical, in fact, identical
comparables are frequently
unavailable. However there must be
sufficient similar factors from which a reasonable
comparison may be
made.
Factors
to be considered in determining the sufficiency of
comparability between controlled and uncontrolled
parties’ transactions are, the functions, risks, contract
terms, economic conditions and the nature of the property
and services.[11]
Functional Analysis
One way
to assure comparability is for the controlled enterprise
to undertake a functional analysis with respect to the
controlled enterprise(s) and the relevant
transaction(s). In brief, functional
analysis is the process of decomposing the
transactional price in order to come close to finding the
arms length price. Functional analysis
is critical to the arms length principle, in fact the “US
Internal Revenue states that the importance of functional
analysis cannot be over emphasized and that virtually all
IRC Sec. 482 cases can be reduced to the following
questions:
a)
What was
done?
b)
What
economically significant functions were involved in doing
it?
c)
Who performed
each function?
d)
What is the
measure of economic value of each function performed by each
party?
e)
What economic
risks were assumed?
f)
Are there any
valuable intangibles used in performing the given
function?
Once the
functions performed by [the] entity have been identified,
you can use the information to lay the groundwork for
selecting comparables”.[12]
Thus the comparable
parties should, by-and-large, perform the same functions,
for example, research and development, warranty, marketing,
or risk, etc.
Again,
although the transactions must be comparable, the do not
have to be identical. Where the
transactions differ § 482 provides for a variety of
adjustments to be made.[13]
Adjustments
There is
a general recognition that distortions to the comparable
models may exist which need to be considered and to allow
for certain adjustments to be made whereby the
transactions may be brought back into a comparable
perspective. Typically comparables may
differ in their market strategy, for example, one may
contemplate a reduced product cost in order to penetrate
a new market or one may have undertaken greater risk such
as variations in monetary exchange rates, or perhaps
advertising or even contractual terms.
Since the ultimate goal is to arrive at the arms length
price adjustments are warranted to reflect the comparable
functions of the controlled and uncontrolled transactions
being tested. This is more of an art
than a science and the code provides scant assistance
beyond examples of some adjustments that would be
relevant to arriving at the arms length
price. Notwithstanding, § 482
recognizes and provides for adjustments where
transactions are reasonably comparable but resist
determining the arms length price without some tweaking.
(See US Steel Corp. v.
Commissioner).[14]
Intent of
the Related Parties
As stated above, § 482 authorizes the Internal Revenue Service
to reallocate the “shifted” gross income, deductions, credits,
etc., between the related parties to avoid tax evasion or
reflect the true effect as determined by application of the
arms length standard.[15]
However, the IRS may only make such allocations where the
related parties transfer price is not reflective of the arms
length price and allocations may not be arbitrary even if there
is tax evasion.[16]
This means that managers
of such entities may shift profits for administrative,
management or even tax planning purposes as they see
fit.[17]
For example, companies
may conduct their affairs in the manner that will attract
the least amount of tax or they may even wish to address the
needs of shareholders by shifting profits to a jurisdiction
more favorable to distribution of dividends. However, the
profits, deductions, etc., involved in the transactions may
be reallocated by the IRS if it is determined that they do
not reflect the arms length price.[18]
Therefore, the actual intent of the related entities,
good or bad, is largely irrelevant where the end result
of their transactions fall outside §
482. Notwithstanding, it is recognized
that the purpose behind the transaction(s) may be helpful
to the IRS in understanding the
transaction. Therefore, on a practical
level, the IRS’s view of the pricing arrangement may be
shaped by the perceived purpose behind
it. Further, identifying a bona fide
business purpose behind the transaction will be an
important factor in an examination or court
decision.[19]
Concerns
of the Revenue Authorities
The tax
authorities in the United States share common goals with
their counterparts in governments throughout the
world. One obvious goal is the
collection of taxes on income properly allocated to it,
however, tax authorities have a much more positive
objective as well, that is to promote international trade
and to adopt a policy consistent with the concepts of tax
neutrality such as avoiding double taxation ad the
reduction of barriers to free trade.[20]
Such
noble aspirations aside, The IRS has some very real
concerns about eroding tax revenues due to multinationals
shifting profits to low or no tax offshore financial
centers by manipulating transaction thus moving taxable
assets beyond its jurisdictional
reach. While such profit shifting goes
on at the domestic level, that is among the state taxing
authorities, it is normally of little concern of the IRS
unless the taxpayers are taxed at differing marginal
rates.[21]
Where
multinationals shift profits offshore, the IRS is
concerned that these related entities would be motivated
to milk profits, engage in fictitious or dubious
intercompany sales and related business
deductions. Even where non-suspect
transactions between domestic companies and their
offshore partners are made, the loss in tax revenue may
prove to be devastating. For example,
the Treasury Department statistics noted a remarkable
rise in the dollar volume of international trade since
the 1960’s due to the expansion in international
marketing of goods and services and global sourcing of
commodities.[22]
§ 482 has proven to be an
effective remedy to such potential erosion, so effective
that it has been exported, nearly unaltered to countries and
tax authorities throughout the world.[23]
Part
II
Methodology
In 1994
the Treasury Department issued revised regulations
suggesting the logic of using certain specified transfer
pricing methodologies to be applied to test for the arms
length price of tangible goods.[24]
These methods, some of
which are known as the traditional transactional methods,
are the comparable uncontrolled price method (CUP), the
resale price method (RPM), and the cost plus method
(CPM). The regulations do not require
that any specific method to used by the related
taxpayer. Where circumstances are such
that more than one method may be applicable, the regulations
provide that the taxpayer consider the level of
comparability, the quality and accuracy of the comparable
data and assumptions. In the end, the method resulting in
the most reliable arms length price is to be
used.[25]
This is known as the “best method
rule.
For
example, were the circumstances are such that the
controlled transaction involve a related manufacturer who
sells to a related distributor who resells the product
without making any significant changes to the product,
the resale price method may be a more appropriate
testing method. Alternatively, were
the distributor makes significant additions, (e.g.,
intangibles) to the product, the cost plus method
may be more accurate. Again, no particular method
is mandated in any given set of facts save that the
method resulting in the most accurate determination of
the arms length price is to be used, that is, the best
method rule.
How
Selection of the Methods Work?
In using
the traditional transactional methods the arms length
price is determined by comparing the price, gross profit
margins or the gross mark up in a controlled transaction
with the uncontrolled transaction dependent upon the
particular circumstances surrounding the
transactions. For example, where the
related parties are a manufacturer and a distributor who
resells the manufactured products without adding or
effecting any significant changes the related taxpayer
may consider using the resale price
method. Alternatively, following this
scenario, where the related distributor adds to or
effects significant changes to the product, the cost plus
method may be more appropriate. Notwithstanding,
the “best method rule” will ultimately determine the
method to be used by the related
taxpayer.
Further,
§ 482, and case law, recognize that the arms length price
is elusive and not an exact science and, as such, the IRS
will normally find a particular arms length price derived
from one of the testing methods to be acceptable if the
testing results falls within a range of arms length
prices.
The
Comparable Uncontrolled Price (CUP)
“The CUP
method is the purest expression of the arms’-length
standard . . .”[26]
Although there is technically no hierarchy of
methods, CUP is normally favored in situations where
comparable uncontrolled methods may be found, however, other
methods may be employed where the results are more
accurate.
One
feature of the CUP method is that it focuses directly on
the price of the controlled transaction as compared to
the price of the uncontrolled transaction In essence, the
CUP method combines the resale price and cost plus
methods thus focusing on a single price.[27]
Further, the CUP is price
rather than function driven unlike the two other traditional
transactional methods which, perforce, focus on the
functions being performed by the parties of the
transaction(s).[28]
Note that
as discussed in Part I, transactions are reasonably
comparable where the products and circumstances are
substantially similar and the differences having effect
on the price are either immaterial or can be eliminated
through the use of adjustments to the uncontrolled
price.[29]
The Resale
Price Method (RPM)
The focus
of the resale price method is on the gross margin
obtained by the distributor. The gross margin is the
selling price of the goods less the cost of operating
costs and functions performed. The
arms length margin is obtained by comparing the
controlled margin with an independent distributor
performing substantially similar functions as the related
distributor.[30]
Differences having effect
on the gross margin are not disqualifying where they are
immaterial or can be eliminated through the use of
adjustments.
The
resale price method may not be used arbitrarily and the
related taxpayer must be prepared to make a reasonable
argument to the IRS/court concerning a comparability
nexus.[31]
Further, RPM, subject to
the best method rule, is generally considered to be most
applicable where a manufacturer sells to a related
distributor who resells to an uncontrolled market and adds
little additional value to the product,[32]
particularly in terms of
intangibles.[33]
Additionally, there are a
number of relevant factors which aid in determining
comparability for the resale price method. They
are:
·
Type of
property sold.
·
Functions
performed by the distributor. (e.g., Adverts, packaging, minor
assembly, service, etc.
·
Effect on price
of any intangible property used by the
seller.
·
Geographic
market.[34]
Note that
physical similarity of the products is not relevant as it
does not generally reflect the mark-up.[35]
The Cost
Plus Method (CPM)
The cost
plus method is, subject to the best method rule, most
applicable where a manufacturer sells to a related
distributor who resells to an uncontrolled market and
adds substantial additional value to the
product,[36]
particularly in terms of intangibles and most
commonly used where there are no comparable unrelated
sales.[37]
The method focuses on the manufacturer’s
gross mark-up with the related manufacturer’s costs being
determined and, an appropriate gross profit mark-up applied
to arrive at the deemed sales price.[38]
Application of CPM is effected by adding to the
controlled sellers production cost a cost equal to that
multiplied by the appropriate gross profit percentage –
the appropriate gross profit percentage is equal to the
gross profit percentage earned on the uncontrolled
transaction(s) most comparable to the related parties’
transaction.[39]
Comparability may be
determined by considering the same factors discussed under
the resale price method. Further, where the circumstances
are such that there are no specific comparables readily
available, the related taxpayer may use the gross profit
percentages of the particular industry.[40]
Notwithstanding, the related taxpayer should
proceed cautiously where opting to use “industry averages”
as the court has indicated an aversion to it use based on
dubious reliability.[41]
Under CPM
adjustments, as with the other methods, may be made where
there are differences in the controlled and uncontrolled
models which have a reasonably ascertainable effect on
the price.[42]
Transactional Profit
Split Method
Intangible property and its genre may create much
difficulty in the analysis of intercompany pricing
arrangements. Inherent to this problem is the
identification of developer of the intangible and in
finding relevant comparables. The
former is easily addressed by Treasury Regulation
1.482-4(f)(3) or by the related parties engaging in cost
sharing agreements,[43]
however, this does not satisfy the latter
issue of the dearth of comparables.
When
faced with this dilemma, the related taxpayer may find it
necessary to use the transactional profit split
method. Notwithstanding, the method is
mutually inclusive and thus may be used in determining
the arms length price for controlled transactions
involving tangible goods or intangibles so long as the
method results in the most accurate determination of the
arms length price or range.
Profit Split Method
(PSM)
The
profit split method starts by focusing on the combined
profit to be split among the related parties, essentially
treating them as an economic unit.
Once identified, those profits are allocated among the
parties to reflect what each related party’s anticipated
share based upon their contribution (function, etc.)
would have been in an arms length
agreement.[44]
The
allocation of profit is then made under one of two
schemes provided for in the regulations: the comparable
profit split and the residual profit
split.[45]
Comparable Profit Split
Under this
method the related entities’ combined operating profits are
allocated to them in proportions with that of the operating
profits of comparable uncontrolled
Entities.
Residual Profit Split
Under this
method a market return is allocated to each controlled party in
the economic unit based on its routine contributions to the
unit. A contribution is deemed routine where uncontrolled
parties make similar contributions to their economic
unit. Then the remaining operating profit is
allocated to each controlled entity in proportions reflecting
their nonroutine contributions such as intangibles not
contributed in the uncontrolled model.[46]
Comparable
Profits Method (CPM)
The
comparable profits method is basically “ . . . a range of
methods that examine the net profit margin realized by a
taxpayer from a controlled transaction relative to an
appropriate base. Possible bases
include the rate of return on assets, operating income to
sales, and other suitable financial
ratios”.[47]
More
specifically, the arms length range is identified by
selecting the uncontrolled entity, and referring to
profit level indicators,[48]
that is, financial ratios that measure the
relationship between profits and other factors such as the
cost incurred in obtaining that profit.
The uncontrolled profit level indicators are then applied to
the tested (controlled party) and if its operating profits
fall within the uncontrolled range, its profits are deemed
to be within the arms length price range.[49]
Note that the CPM is
sometimes referred to as the transactional net margin method
or (TNMM).
Final
Note
This
article was designed to serve as the title indicates,
that is, a primer. The topic of
transfer pricing is an ever-evolving field of “art”,
masquerading as science. There are
wonderful arguments on both sides, each relevant when
viewed with the opposition’s
spectacles. Transfer pricing will, in
my opinion, undergo radical changes over the next decade
and the reader is well advised to stay alert for the most
current winds of change. Still, any
changes or modification in transfer pricing rules will be
firmly based on the fundamental principles discussed in
this article.
About
The Author: Peter J.
Loughlin is a lawyer with Goldman &
Loughlin, PLLC Law Firm and a former principle member
of Juris Consults Group. He holds two
law degrees and is a member of the State Bar of
California, Federal Bar Association, International Bar
Association and Royal Society of
Fellows.
Notice: United States Department of Treasury Regulation
Circular 230 requires that we notify you that, with respect to
any statements regarding tax matters made herein, including any
attachments, (1) nothing herein was intended or written to be
used, and cannot be used by you, to avoid tax penalties; and
(2) nothing contained herein was intended or written to be
used, and cannot be used, or referred to in any marketing or
promotional materials. Further, to the extent any tax statement
or tax advice is made herein, Peter J. Loughlin and
Goldman & Loughlin, PLLC does not and will not impose
any limitation on disclosure of the tax treatment or tax
structure of any transactions to which such tax statement or
tax advice relates. The Information provided here is
for general information only and is not intended to nor does it
constitute legal or tax advice to any person or entity. You
should review your particular circumstances with your
independent legal and tax
advisors.
[1]
Graetz, Michael, J.,
O’Hear, Michael, M. The Original Intent of U.S.
International Taxation Duke Law Journal
(1997).
[5]
DeSilva, Lucky.
Transfer Pricing Module 1, St. Thomas
University LL.M. Program, (Oct. 2001). According to
the author, “[I]n 18th century England,
cotton mill owners who whished to identify the
profitable parts of their business used transfer
prices”.
[6]
Treasury Regulation §
1.482-1(i)(4).
[7]
B. Forman C. v.
Commissioner 453 F2d 1144 (2d Cir).
[8]
DHL Corp. v.
Commissioner PAGE 4 of 14 Ch 3.02
[9]
Doernberg, Richard, L.
International Taxation
(1999) page 227.
[10]
DeSilva, L. supra and
Art. 9 at par. 1 O.E.C.D. Model Tax
Convention.
[11]
Treasury Regulation §
1.482-1(d).
[12]
Stephens, Andrew.
Functional Analysis, St. Thomas University
LL.M. Program, as a thread to the discussion board
(Nov. 15 2001).
[13]
Treasury Regulation
1.482-1(d).
[14]
United States Steel
Corp. v Commissioner 2d Cir. (1980) and Treasury
Regulation § 1.482-3(b)(2).
[15]
Doernberg, Richard, L.,
supra.
[17]
Bausch & Lomb,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 TC 287
(1951).
[19]
Hammer, Richard, M.,
Lowell, Cym, H., Burge, Marianne, & Levey, Marc,
M. International Transfer Pricing – OECD
Guidelines Ch 3.02(5) (2001).
[21]
Kalish. Tax
Planning: A Defense for Domestic Intercompany
Adjustments under 482, 34 N.Y.U. INST. FED.
Tax’N 285, 287, -96 (1976).
[22]
Higinbothham, Harlow,
N., et al. Effective Application of the Section
482 Transfer Pricing Regulations
(1987).
[23]
Hammer, R., et al,
supra at Ch 3.01.
[24]
I.d., at Ch
14.16[3][a].
[25]
I.d. and Treasury
Regulation 1.482-1(c)(1).
[26]
Hammer, R., et al,
supra at Ch.14.16 [3][a][i].
[27]
DeSiva, L
Introduction to Transfer Pricing St.
Thomas
LL.M. Program, Anti Avoidance, Module 7 (March
2001).
[29]
Treasury Regulation §
1.482-2(e)(2)(ii), also see United States Steel
Corp. v Commissioner, supra.
[30]
DeSilva, L. supra at
note 5.
[31]
Dupont De Nemours,
Inc. v. United States 608 F.2d 445
(1979).
[32]
Treasury Regulation §
1.482-3(c).
[33]
Doernberg, R.,
supra.
[34]
Higinbothham, H.
supra.
[36]
Treasury Regulation §
1.482-3(d).
[37]
Doernberg, R.,
supra.
[39]
Higinbothham, H.
supra.
[41]
Nissho Iwai Am.
Corp. v. Commissioner 50 T.C.M. 1483,1498
(1985).
[42]
Treasury Regulation
1.482-2(e)(4)(v).
[43]
Treasury Regulation
1.482-7(a)(1).
[44]
DeSilva, L. supra at
note 28.
[45]
Tax Regulation
1.482-6(c)(1) and Doernberg, R., supra.
[46]
Doernberg, R.,
supra.
[47]
DeSilva, L. supra at
note 28.
[48]
Treasury Regulation
1.482-5(e).
[49]
Doernberg, R.,
supra.
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